It is a widespread assumption that permanent philosophical dissensus indicates that none of the parties has philosophical knowledge. However, this assumption is based on the view that the philosophers’ community would recognize instances of individual philosophical knowledge if someone had such epistemic achievement. The problem is that it is challenging to justify this view because the idea that the community of philosophers is epistemically deprived is neither self-contradictory nor falsified by the available evidence. So it seems that one should be agnostic about the abilities of the community of philosophers. In our paper, we propose a non-evidential way of defending the trust in the philosophers’ community. We argue that one can hold—without (almost) any evidence—the belief that the community would recognize instances of philosophical knowledge because one is epistemically entitled to believe in the minimal reliability of the community of philosophers.

中文翻译：

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我们会识别哲学知识的例子吗？


一个普遍的假设是，永久的哲学分歧表明没有一个党派拥有哲学知识。然而，这一假设是基于这样一种观点，即如果某人具有这种认识成就，哲学家社区就会承认个人哲学知识的实例。问题在于，要证明这种观点的合理性是具有挑战性的，因为哲学家群体在认识论上被剥夺的观点既不是自相矛盾的，也不是被现有证据证伪的。因此，似乎应该对哲学家社区的能力持不可知论的态度。在我们的论文中，我们提出了一种非证据的方式来捍卫哲学家社区的信任。我们认为，一个人可以持有——在（几乎）没有任何证据的情况下——相信社区会承认哲学知识的实例，因为一个人在认识论上有权相信哲学家社区的最低可靠性。