In this paper, I present and defend a novel way for non-naturalists to account for the sui generis status of normative facts, which is consistent with the claim that contingent normative facts obtain in virtue of non-normative facts. According to what I call unsupplemented partial ground approach, non-derivative normative facts have non-normative partial grounds, but are not fully grounded in any collection of facts. This view entails that an explanatory gap separates the normative from the non-normative domain. I argue that this account provides non-naturalists with a metaphysically coherent response to the challenge of accounting for explanatory dependence relations between two domains while positing metaphysical discontinuity (explanatory challenge), and avoids serious objections that alternative non-naturalist accounts face. Moreover, I show that the unsupplemented partial ground approach is an attractive option for the popular Reasons-First approach, which is often, but I argue prematurely, considered a particularly promising account for non-naturalists.

在本文中，我提出并捍卫了一种新颖的方法，让非自然主义者解释规范性事实的特殊地位，这与或有规范性事实凭借非规范性事实获得的主张是一致的。根据我所说的无补充的部分基础方法，非衍生的规范性事实具有非规范性的部分基础，但并不完全基于任何事实集合。这种观点意味着一个解释性差距将规范性领域与非规范性领域分开。我认为，这种解释为非自然主义者提供了一种形而上学的连贯回应，以应对解释两个领域之间的解释依赖关系的挑战，同时提出形而上学的不连续性（解释性挑战），并避免了其他非自然主义解释面临的严重反对意见。此外，我表明，对于流行的 Reasons-First 方法来说，未补充的部分接地法是一个有吸引力的选择，这通常被认为是非自然主义者特别有前途的解释，但我过早地论证。