Summativism about group evidence holds that the evidence of a group is a function of the evidence of its members. In this paper, I put forward a novel knowledge-first summative view of group evidence formulated in terms of the notion of being in a position to know rather than knowledge. In developing this view, I address several crucial questions for any adequate account of group evidence: whether group evidence is factive, whether a group must be able to act on E for it to count as evidence, whether the logical consequences of the group members’ evidence should be included in the group’s evidence, and, more importantly, the nature of the epistemic relationship that must exist between E and a group for E to be part of its evidence. In addressing these questions, I respond to recent criticism by Jessica Brown (Noûs 56:494–510, 2022; Philos Stud 180:3161–3178, 2023; Groups as epistemic and moral agents, Oxford University Press, 2024) against summative views.

关于群体证据的总结论认为，一个群体的证据是其成员证据的函数。在本文中，我提出了一种新的知识优先的群体证据总结性观点，该观点是根据处于了解位置而不是知识的概念来表述的。在发展这一观点时，我解决了几个关键问题，以便对群体证据进行充分的解释：群体证据是否有效，群体是否必须能够对 E 采取行动才能将其视为证据，群体成员证据的逻辑后果是否应包含在群体的证据中，以及更重要的是， E 和一组之间必须存在的认识关系的性质，才能使 E 成为其证据的一部分。在回答这些问题时，我回应了杰西卡·布朗 （Jessica Brown） 最近的批评（Noûs 56：494–510,2022 年;Philos Stud 180：3161–3178,2023 年;作为认识论和道德代理人的群体，牛津大学出版社，2024 年）反对总结性观点。