This paper argues for a responsibilist account of knowledge: S knows that p iff S believes the truth that p (rather than one of the alternatives to p) because S forms/retains the belief in a way that is ultima facie epistemically responsible. This account implies that knowing that p requires neither having evidence that favors p over ∼p, nor possessing reliabilist virtues, nor exhibiting responsibilist virtues or motives.

中文翻译：

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对知识的责任主义描述


本文主张对知识的责任主义解释：S 知道 p 如果 S 相信 p 的真理（而不是 p 的替代方案之一），因为 S 以一种表面上对认识负有责任的方式形成/保留信念。这种解释意味着，知道 p 既不需要有支持 p 而不是 ∼p 的证据，也不需要拥有可靠性主义的美德，也不需要表现出负责任的美德或动机。