The popular predictive processing (PP) framework posits prediction error minimization (PEM) as the sole mechanism in the brain that can account for all mental phenomena, including consciousness. I first highlight three ambitions associated with major presentations of PP: (1) Completeness (PP aims for a comprehensive account of mental phenomena), (2) Bayesian realism (PP claims that PEM is implemented in the brain rather than providing only a model), and (3) Naturalism (PP is typically presented as yielding a naturalistic view of the mind). Then I demonstrate that many proponents of PP also endorse a form of Kantian transcendental idealism (TI), based on a characterization of experiential content as the brain's currently best hypothesis about the world. I argue that endorsing this claim (4), that is, that we only experience the world as it appears, but not the world itself, sabotages achieving the three ambitions. The argument proceeds by discussing the prospects of each ambition in turn, drawing on discussions in the philosophy of science about realism and its alternatives, about the motivation and features of computational models, and about the foundational role of consciousness for science.

中文翻译：

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预测处理与先验唯心主义的调情

流行的预测处理 （PP） 框架将预测误差最小化 （PEM） 假设为大脑中唯一可以解释所有心理现象（包括意识）的机制。我首先强调与 PP 的主要介绍相关的三个雄心壮志：（1） 完整性（PP 旨在全面描述心理现象），（2） 贝叶斯现实主义（PP 声称 PEM 是在大脑中实现的，而不仅仅是提供一个模型），以及 （3） 自然主义（PP 通常表现为产生一种自然主义的心灵观点）。然后我证明，PP 的许多支持者也支持康德先验唯心主义 （TI） 的一种形式，该论点基于将经验内容描述为大脑目前对世界的最佳假设。我认为，支持这一主张 （4），即我们只体验世界的外表，而不是世界本身，破坏了实现三个抱负。该论证通过依次讨论每个雄心壮志的前景，借鉴了科学哲学中关于现实主义及其替代方案、计算模型的动机和特征以及意识对科学的基础作用的讨论。