Many philosophers agree that the distinction between lying and misleading is detected by reliable intuitions in some prototypical cases and a diagnostic test that accords misleaders, but not liars, a kind of deniability for the disbelieved information they communicate. In this paper I take the soundness of such intuitions for granted and provide a definition of lying that explains the deniability that is detected by the diagnostic test. I argue that liars differ from misleaders in that liars intentionally misuse semantic conventions for communicating disbelieved information. What misleaders can and liars cannot deny is the semantic commitment to disbelieved information. In doing so, misleaders keep, while liars lose, the status of speakers who do their part for maintaining the semantic conventions of their language.

中文翻译：

---

说谎者的语义承诺

许多哲学家都同意，在一些典型案例中，通过可靠的直觉和一种诊断测试来检测撒谎和误导之间的区别，这种测试赋予误导者而不是说谎者对他们传达的不信信息的一种否认。在本文中，我认为这种直觉的合理性是理所当然的，并提供了一个谎言的定义，以解释诊断测试检测到的否认性。我认为说谎者与误导者的不同之处在于，说谎者故意滥用语义约定来传达不相信的信息。误导者可以否认而说谎者不能否认的是，对不相信信息的语义承诺。这样做，误导者保持了说话者的地位，而说谎者则失去了说话者的地位，他们尽了自己的一份力量来维护他们语言的语义惯例。